“Convertir el λóγος más débil en el más fuerte”, no debería limitarse a ser considerada como la definición del arte de la retórica según un Aristóteles profundamente influenciado por la recepción platónica de esta técnica. La filosofía, considerada como una disciplina, innegablemente ha avanzado, a pesar de que muchas veces el objeto de estudio que nos interesa se haya perdido o nos haya llegado fragmentado. En este contexto se levanta el esfuerzo del Dr. Benjamín Ugalde (1981) por convertir (...) la discusión en torno de pensamiento de aquellos pensadores que han sido relegados a una segunda categoría respecto a la filosofía oficialista en un lugar que merece una mayor consideración, que merece un análisis tan profundo como las filosofías que en occidente se han erguido como las más fuertes. (shrink)

In this article, we address a major outstanding question of probabilistic Bayesian epistemology: how should a rational Bayesian agent update their beliefs upon learning an indicative conditional? A number of authors have recently contended that this question is fundamentally underdetermined by Bayesian norms, and hence that there is no single update procedure that rational agents are obliged to follow upon learning an indicative conditional. Here we resist this trend and argue that a core set of widely accepted Bayesian norms is (...) sufficient to identify a normatively privileged updating procedure for this kind of learning. Along the way, we justify a privileged formalization of the notion of ‘epistemic conservativity’, offer a new analysis of the Judy Benjamin problem, and emphasize the distinction between interpreting the content of new evidence and updating one’s beliefs on the basis of that content. (shrink)

Diese Hardcover-Ausgabe ist Teil der TREDITION CLASSICS. Der Verlag tredition aus Hamburg veroffentlicht in der Buchreihe TREDITION CLASSICS Werke aus mehr als zwei Jahrtausenden. Diese waren zu einem Grossteil vergriffen oder nur noch antiquarisch erhaltlich. Mit TREDITION CLASSICS verfolgt tredition das Ziel, tausende Klassiker der Weltliteratur verschiedener Sprachen wieder als gedruckte Bucher zu verlegen - und das weltweit! Die Buchreihe dient zur Bewahrung der Literatur und Forderung der Kultur. Sie tragt so dazu bei, dass viele tausend Werke nicht in Vergessenheit (...) geraten. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to explain and defend the following argument: (1) If it can be reasonably doubted that someone had free will with respect to some action, then it is a requirement of justice to refrain from doing serious retributive harm to him in response to that action. (2) Anyone who believes the free will debate to be philosophically valuable must accept that it can be reasonably doubted that anyone ever has free will. (3) Therefore, anyone who (...) believes the free will debate to be philosophically valuable must accept that it is a requirement of justice to refrain from serious retributive harm. (shrink)

Hermeneutical injustice occurs when there is a gap in the interpretive resources available to members of a society due to the marginalization of members of a social group from sense‐making practices. In this paper, I address two questions about hermeneutical injustice that are undertheorized in the recent literature: (1) what do we mean when we say that someone lacks the interpretive resources for making sense of an experience? and (2) how do marginalized individuals develop interpretive resources? In response to (1), (...) I argue that to lack interpretive resources is to lack conceptual skill or know how. In response to (2), I draw on resources from Gilbert Ryle and Andy Clark and provide a model of how marginalized individuals develop new conceptual skills by naming their shared experience and using it as a tool for scaffolding each other's conceptual performance. At the same time, I draw on the work of Gaile Pohlhaus and Kristie Dotson to show how these practices succeed only through the redistribution of epistemic power across differently situated social groups. (shrink)

Deirdre McCloskey is rightly one of the most recognizable names in economics. She views economics as a language that uses all the rhetorical devices of everyday conversation and therefore it should be judged by aesthetic and literary standards and not the criteria of mathematical rigor that is espoused by the mainstream. This controversial standpoint has been hugely influential and this examination of the methodological and philosophical consequences of her work is overdue, and very welcome.

Many necessitarians about cause and law (Armstrong 1983; Mumford 2004; Bird 2007) have argued that Humeans are unable to justify their inductive inferences, as Humean laws are nothing but the sum of their instances. In this paper I argue against these necessitarian claims. I show that Armstrong is committed to the explanatory value of Humean laws (in the form of universally quantified statements), and that contra Armstrong, brute regularities often do have genuine explanatory value. I finish with a Humean attempt (...) at a probabilistic justification of induction, but this fails due to its assumption that the proportionality syllogism is justified. Although this attempt fails, I nonetheless show that the Humean is at least as justified in reasoning inductively as Armstrong. (shrink)

The work of Jean-Francois Lyotard signals the return of judgement to the centre of philosophical concerns. This collection of papers is the first devoted to his work and provides an estimation and critique of his writings, and included Lyotard's important essay on _Sensus Communis_.

The physician’s duty of confidentiality is based on the observance of the patient’s privacy and intimacy and on the importance of respecting both of these rights, thus creating a relationship of confidence and collaboration between doctor and patient. The main objective of this work consists of analyzing the aspects that are related to the confidentiality of patients’ data with respect to the training, conduct and opinions of doctors from different Clinical Management Units of a third-level hospital via a questionnaire. The (...) present study aimed to define the problem and determine whether the opinions of these professionals correspond to those observed in a previous work conducted at the same center. Of the 200 questionnaires that were collected, 62.5% were from consultants and the rest were from residents with an average of 14.4 ± 12.5 years in professional practice. The respondents noted habitual situations in which confidentiality was breached in the reference hospital. The section on their attitudes and behaviors towards situations related to confidentiality showed a slightly lower average score than that of their medical knowledge; significant differences in these scores were observed between the consultants and residents as well as between the extreme age groups and years of professional practice, thus more inadequate attitudes were consistently noted in younger doctors who had fewer years of experience. Finally, the respondents answered that the training of doctors in the aspects of healthcare law and ethics was the most important measure that the hospital could adopt regarding confidentiality practices. (shrink)

This paper evaluates recent proposals for compatibilism about doxastic freedom, and attempts to refine them by applying Fischer and Ravizza’s moderate reasons-responsiveness compatibilism to doxastic freedom. I argue, however, that even this refined version of doxastic compatibilism is subject to challenging counter-examples and is more difficult to support than traditional compatibilism about freedom of action. In particular, it is much more difficult to identify convincing examples of the sort Frankfurt proposed to challenge the idea that responsibility requires alternative possibilities.

This paper observes that in the midst of a thickening debate over the concept of “epistemic possibility,” nearly every philosopher assumes that the concept is equivalent to a mere absence of epistemic impossibility, that a proposition is epistemically possible if and only if our knowledge does not entail that it is false. I suggest that it is high time that we challenge this deeply entrenched assumption. I assemble an array of data that singles out the distinctive meaning and function of (...) epistemic possibility, which suggest it to be distinct from other modals and an attitude toward a proposition, not a part of the content of a proposition. I suggest that this data is best explained by a positive evidentialist conception of epistemic possibility, one which maintains that a proposition is epistemically possible to a subject only if there is evidence specifically in support of that proposition that is cognitively available to that subject. I suggest that this view not only offers a superior explanation of the data, but also offers a unique and straightforward strategy for undermining skeptical arguments. (shrink)

This chapter offers non-retributive, broadly Kantian justifications of punishment and remorse that can be endorsed by free will skeptics. We lose our grip on some Kantian ideas if we become skeptical about free will, but we can preserve some important ones that can do valuable work for free will skeptics. The justification of punishment presented here has consequentialist features but is deontologically constrained by our duty to avoid using others as mere means. It draws on a modified Rawlsian original position (...) in which we assume we are just as likely to be among the punished when the veil of ignorance is raised as we are to be among those protected by the institution of punishment. The justification of remorse presented here is care-based and draws on the value of sympathizing with people we have wronged, which has a Kantian ground in the duty to take others’ ends as our own. (shrink)

If Unamuno had been able to choose how to be remembered, he would have wanted him to be a poet. This book wants to do justice to that happy possibility. But above all because Unamuno was a poet in the highest sense: he was while writing the same essay as a novel, or theater, letter or verse, and he was also a poet when he passionately lived all the facets of his intense existence. His intellectual work was poetic and his (...) personal relationships, as well as his political activity, also responded to that peculiar Unamunian aesthetic in which the vital horizon is inescapably confused with the tasks of thought." --Translated from back cover. (shrink)

This article examines Grotius’s use of a Roman tradition to establish his notion of a natural and international law in his early treatise De iure praedae (1604-1606). It is argued that De iure praedae, on a methodological level, constituted an attempt to introduce a new doctrine of sources of law by making use of the method of classical rhetoric. On a substantive level, the treatise must be seen as growing out of a Ciceronian tradition of natural law arguments in favor (...) of just war, a tradition further enriched by Grotius with concepts taken from the property law of the Digest. These concepts afforded Grotius with the substantive framework to develop his doctrine of subjective natural rights as sketched in the hitherto unpublished early manuscript Theses LVI. An implication of this investigation of the Roman foundations of Grotius’s theory of natural law is that it challenges widespread assumptions about the “positive” character of ancient liberty. (shrink)

Benjamin Gibbs; Autonomy and Authority in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 119–132, https://doi.org/10.1111.

This Element explains Kant's distinction between rational sympathy and natural sympathy. Rational sympathy is regulated by practical reason and is necessary for adopting as our own those ends of others which are contingent from the perspective of practical rationality. Natural sympathy is passive and can prompt affect and dispose us to act wrongly. Sympathy is a function of a posteriori productive imagination. In rational sympathy, we freely use the imagination to step into others' first-person perspectives and associate imagined intuitional contents (...) with the concepts others use to communicate their feelings. This prompts feelings in us that are like their feelings. (shrink)

This paper argues that the cognitive status and cognitive value of thoughts should be clarified through a description of the mechanics of the theoretical power of judgment. Three pairs of concepts essentially constitute its tools: 1. determinative and reflective judgments; 2. constitutive and regulative principles; and 3. transcendental and empirical applications. Against the general approach to dealing with these concepts, i.e., against the tendency to consider them as synonymous or as forming a parallel structure, this article sharpens the distinctions between (...) these three pairs of concepts. For that reason the methodological hypothesis according to which there is no inner relation between these respective pairs of concepts will be put to the test. The hypothesis says that these concepts should be prima facie combinable: e. g., one should be able to say what a judgment that is simultaneously transcendental, regulative and determining would be like, or why such a combination is impossible. Combining the three concept-pairs creates eight possibilities that are presented systematically in the table at the end of the article. The discussion shows the precise status of each kind of law of nature and their relationships to empirical experience are described in greater detail. (shrink)

Philosophy of Medicine has for a long time been preoccupied with analyzing the concepts of health, disease and illness. Relatively speaking, the concept of medicine itself has received very little attention. This paper is a contribution to the relatively neglected debate about the nature of medicine. Building on the work of Alex Broadbent (Broadbent, 2018a, b), Chadwin Harris (Harris, 2018) and Thaddeus Metz (Metz, 2018), in this paper I question the persuasiveness of Broadbent’s account of the “core business” of medicine, (...) The Inquiry Thesis, and propose an alternative: a revised version of The Curative Thesis, which I coin The Best Available Intervention Thesis. Crudely, this suggests that Medicine is the sustained and organised effort to determine and prescribe the best available treatment (curative or preventative) for patients. (shrink)

Background To identify and to summarize challenges related to the informed consent process for research completed during humanitarian emergencies. Methods Using relevant search terms, a search of 5 databases was completed, without language, date, or study type restriction. Studies were screened for inclusion, with eligible studies being those that were relevant to the informed consent process for research studies completed in humanitarian emergencies. A Grounded Theory Analysis was completed to identify themes and subthemes. Results Review identified 30 relevant studies. We (...) identified 11 challenges (lack of trust, therapeutic misconception, reduced capacity, security and privacy concerns, harmful research, power differential, literacy, language/local and cultural context, researcher burden and re-evaluation of ongoing trials) and 7 strategies (engage local research communities, use alternative to standard written consent process, modify traditional process of research ethics board review, dynamic consent, training of research staff, mandating transparency of commercial interests, and mandating reporting of informed consent process in all publications) to confront the challenges. These challenges and strategies were unique to the informed consent process in research conducted during humanitarian emergencies. Conclusions This scoping review identified an evidence-based guide for researchers and research ethics boards to perform ethical informed consent procedures in humanitarian emergencies. Trial Registration This trial was not registered as scoping reviews can not be registered as per updated PROSPERO guidelines. (shrink)

Recently, many comparativists and democratic theorists have argued that democracy is in imminent peril, even in countries that are thought to be its strongholds. But theorists like Andrew Gamble, Wolfgang Streeck, and David Runciman suggest that some democracies are too embedded to collapse. Instead, they argue these democracies are experiencing long-term structural crises. This article explains how this alternative kind of crisis works. It conceives of legitimacy crises as ‘chronic crises’ in which democratic procedures are contested even as the democratic (...) political system is affirmed. In these crises, democracies are threatened by distortion and deadlock rather than death. The article gives a precise account of chronic legitimacy crises. It treats legitimacy as a scalar concept, going beyond binary views where legitimacy is something a state either has or lacks. It distinguishes periods of chronic crisis from stable periods and from acute crises. It shows how chronic crises are distinctively about legitimacy. It carves out conceptual space for a different kind of legitimacy crisis, and it assists comparativists in thinking about how younger democracies differ from older ones. (shrink)